Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.19/4881
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dc.contributor.authorMatos, Maria Cristina P.-
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Manuel Alberto M.-
dc.contributor.authorFilipe, José António-
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-09T11:54:37Z-
dc.date.available2018-04-09T11:54:37Z-
dc.date.issued2018-01-
dc.identifier.issn1751200X-
dc.identifier.issn1751-2018-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.19/4881-
dc.descriptionhttps://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85042658835&origin=inward&txGid=54037553b7c39777dd48bbc2f47d6cacpt_PT
dc.description.abstractReal life is a bigger game in which what a player does early on can affect what others choose to do later on. In particular, we can strive to explain how cooperative behaviour can be established as a result of rational behaviour. When engaged in a repeated situation, players must consider not only their short-term gains but also their long-term payoffs. The general idea of repeated games is that players may be able to deter another player from exploiting his short-term advantage by threatening a punishment that reduces his long-term payoff. The aim of the paper that supports this abstract is to present and discuss dynamic game theory. There are three basic kinds of reasons, which are not mutually exclusive, to study what happens in repeated games. First, it provides a pleasant and a very interesting theory and it has the advantage of making us become more humble in our predictions. Second, many of the most interesting economic interactions repeated often can incorporate a phenomenon which we believe are important but which are not captured when we restrict our attention to static games. Finally, economics, and equilibrium-based theories more generally, do best when analysing routinised interactions. Copyright © 2018 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.pt_PT
dc.description.sponsorshipCI&DETSpt_PT
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.publisherInderscience Enterprises Ltdpt_PT
dc.rightsrestrictedAccesspt_PT
dc.subjectDynamic Gamespt_PT
dc.subjectCode Form Gamept_PT
dc.subjectRepeated Gamept_PT
dc.titleLet Games Begin and Go onpt_PT
dc.typearticlept_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
degois.publication.firstPage43pt_PT
degois.publication.lastPage52pt_PT
degois.publication.issue1pt_PT
degois.publication.locationSuiçapt_PT
degois.publication.titleInternational Journal of Business and Systems Researchpt_PT
degois.publication.volume12pt_PT
dc.identifier.doi10.1504/IJBSR.2018.088463pt_PT
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://www.inderscience.com/jhome.php?jcode=ijbsrpt_PT
Aparece nas colecções:ESTGV - DMAT - Artigos publicados em revista científica (Indexados à ISI)

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