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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
In bilateral Negotiation Analysis, the literature often considers the case of
complete information. In this context, since the negotiators know the value functions
of both parties, it is not difficult to calculate the Pareto efficient solutions for the negotiation.
Thus rational negotiators can reach agreement on this frontier. However, these
approaches are not applied in practicewhen complete information is not available. The
research question of ourwork is “It is possible to help negotiators achieving an efficient
solution in the absence of complete information regarding the different parameters of
the model?”. We propose to derive incomplete information about the preferences of
negotiators from the statements they make and the offers they exchange during the
negotiation process. We present and discuss three approaches that use this information
in order to help a mediator proposing a better solution than the compromise the
negotiators have reached or are close to reach.
Description
Keywords
Incomplete information Negotiation Mediation Integrative negotiation Dance of the packages