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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
In a context of organizational change franchising appears as a new systemic trend of enterprise context. In the provision of health and Well-being services there has been, in last the 10 years, a huge increase in demand of this type of organizational form, to solve issues of employment and creation of self- employment. Two of the organizational problems that modify the behavior of these networks are opportunism (free-riding) and adverse election (hold-up). It is the necessary, therefore, to structure and to define mechanisms of control in the development of the networks and the proper units of franchising, so that the companies do not disappear, jeopardizing a whole system of creating a brand, a image, an investment and know-how. This article intends to demonstrate that the bigger the problems of hold-up and free-riding in franchising systems, the greater the probability of the franchisor to supply territorial exclusiveness to the franchisees. It seems, therefore, that the territorial exclusiveness is the guarantee, for a franchisor, that the return on fixed investments of franchisee will not be later considered out of control or may lead to a lack of business sustainability.
Description
Keywords
Networks Franchising Health and Welfare Sector Portugal/Spain